Boxing Day 2004 tsunami review: Government, UN and NGOs' dismal housing effort in Aceh
Aid organisations blame land issuess, but other big reasons are revealed in AC's two years review for Engineers Australia magazine, December 2006 issue.
7 Dec 06 - Oxfam: More than 25,000 landless families still waiting in barracks
4 Dec 06 - Reuters: Aceh survivors need an estimated 128,000 homes, but only 43,400 built so far
18 Sep 06: Survivor, not supply orientation leads NGOs' main lessons from big tsunami spend: Customer, not supply orientation: Aid organisations are still talking about it - what businesses leant in the 1970s; what goverments sold their businesses for in the '80s and 90's to make happen. Highlighting the NGO association ACFID's report on lessons learnt from the Tsunami, in seminar 4 Aug 06 attended by 21 ACFID-member NGOs.
12 Sep 06: Lazy giving does not work! Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pushes NGOs, in a confidence boost for disillusioned donors: Microsoft-type best practice being introduced in the aid industry could force NGOs to be more accountable in the way they compete for and use funds.
TEC recommends media to be targeted to explain what makes an effective donor - the TEC report said: "The media should be targeted for such education, to improve the quality of reporting on disasters and funding for disasters."
Inevitable that donors will be put off by poor reconstruction record in Aceh - 6 Aug 06 - New York Times reviews TEC report.
DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction): TEC's points for aid community action with host governments - Tsunami Evauation Coalition makes action points about DRR principles, "previously advocated by rarely adequately funded or supported".
TEC July 2006 Executive Summary with top links added to drill-down to key paragraphs - From July 2006 report of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, with Bill Clinton's forward, then the Executive Summary unedited, with source links at the bottom below Summary Recommendation.
TEC Report highlights from Agence France-Presse 13 Jul 06 - from a press report when Tsunami Evaluation Coalition issued the Synthesis Report.
7 Dec 06: Oxfam warns on Aceh's homeless - Source http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6214666.stm
Over 25,000 poor and landless families in Aceh, Indonesia are missing out on the rebuilding programme and have yet to be re-housed nearly two years after the tsunami washed away their homes and destroyed their land, international aid agency Oxfam warned today.
Aceh is the largest reconstruction project in the developing world and a lot of work has been done already, thanks to the generous international response and prompt action by the Indonesian government. So far over a third of the 128,000 houses needed have been built.
But land rights are a major obstacle in re-housing the landless. Many landless people are still languishing in barracks: temporary buildings where many families live in cramped, often unhygienic conditions.
Today Oxfam issued a new report, "The Tsunami Two Years On: Land Rights in Aceh," and urged the Indonesian government to find a fair and just way of re-housing the landless.
"Aceh has made enormous strides towards recovering from the tsunami," said Jeremy Hobbs, director of Oxfam International. "But two years after the tsunami struck, the poorest Acehnese – squatters, renters and women – are still facing a crisis over when and where they will be resettled.
"The lack of a clear policy for landless people has led to a huge amount of uncertainty and delay. There's a risk these people will end up in the slums of the future, despite the huge amounts generously given after the tsunami."
Aceh, the northern province of the island of Sumatra, was the region worst affected by the tsunami of 26 Dec 2004. Around 169,000 people were killed, 600,000 made homeless and 141,000 houses destroyed.
Aceh is the largest reconstruction project in the developing world but Oxfam's new report highlights the difficulties that must be tackled:
- Most of the land titles in the province were destroyed or made illegible – 15 tonnes of records have been sent to Jakarta to be restored.
- Most people lost all their identification documents.
- Land was submerged – up to 15% of western Aceh's agricultural land could be permanently lost.
- There was a huge number of inheritance claims.
- The trees and paths which marked out plots of land were washed away.
"Rebuilding homes without knowing who owns the land could create problems in the future," said Hobbs. "But this can be a desperately difficult and slow process. Oxfam has been working with tens of villages in Aceh to help people decide how to reallocate land so everyone has somewhere to live."
Around 10,000 households who owned property before the tsunami now need resettling because their land became submerged or was ruined. The Indonesian government has bought 700 hectares of land for them but progress is slow – only 700 houses have been built and occupied.
Many poorer Acehnese rented their homes, or squatted on state-owned or private land. There are 15,000 households of renters and squatters who need new land to live on. They do not qualify for any new land or housing but are being given a cash grant. Oxfam fears this is not enough help for the people most in need. Given the slow pace of reconstruction their money will be eaten up by Aceh's high inflation before a new house is ready for them.
Together these groups form the bulk of those suffering in the barracks. Oxfam is calling for the Indonesian government to adopt and effectively implement a range of new policies which would offer more protection for the landless and renters and squatters.
The agency wants to see:
- A commitment by the Indonesian government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to find a long-term solution to the barracks problem.
- Better cooperation between the Indonesian government and NGOs in Aceh to create a range of options for renters and squatters.
- Where possible, a process of resettlement done on a village-by-village basis with the agreement of all members of the village.
- Rental agreements restored.
Contact
For more information, please contact:
Sean Kenny, +44 1865 472 359
Christelle Chapoy, +62 812 69 88 064
Notes to Editors
1. The damage to Aceh in the tsunami was estimated at over US$4.5bn (£2.3bn). A quarter of Aceh's population lost their jobs in the tsunami.
2. Over 150,000 hectares of agricultural land became unsuitable for growing crops after it was inundated with mud and salt water.
3. Oxfam has helped over 474,000 people. It has supplied over 40m liters of water and given jobs to over 100,000 people, built over 30 bridges and over 100km of roads. Up to Sept 2006 Oxfam had spent US$67m in Aceh and aims to spend US$104m over four years.
4. The Indonesian government is aiming to title 600,000 plots of land through the Reconstruction of Aceh's Land Administration System (RALAS) project. By mid-2006 RALAS had only issued 2,608 land certificates.
5. Up to November 2006, 48,000 houses had been built in Aceh. The target is 128,000.
6. There are 70,000 people living in around 150 barracks across Aceh.
Housing in Indonesia's Aceh needs 2007 resolution
04 Dec 2006 Source: Reuters http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/JAK266013.htm
By Jerry Norton
BANDA ACEH, Indonesia, Dec. 4 (Reuters) - Problems that keep thousands living in temporary shelters in Indonesia nearly two years after a tsunami wiped out their homes need to be resolved by the end of 2007, a top U.N. recovery official said on Monday.
Indonesia's Aceh province was hardest hit among areas in the region affected by the Dec. 26 Indian Ocean tsunami. The disaster left some 170,000 dead or missing in Aceh and displaced half a million people.
Of 128,000 permanent homes required for the displaced, only 43,400 have been built, according to U.N. figures. Aside from some 12,000 families still in barracks, thousands more are in transitional shelters or staying with other people.
"The housing issue, basic human shelter, has to be solved by the end of 2007," Eric Morris, U.N. recovery coordinator for Aceh, told Reuters in an interview.
"I think there are concerns that it may go over a bit, to 2008, but I think at this stage it's quite important ... let's try and make it by the end of 2007."
One barrier to getting people into permanent housing has been the difficulty in establishing land titles. The tsunami destroyed a large number of property records, and many people in Aceh, on Sumatra island's northern tip, lacked clear titles to start with.
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, in his role as U.N. special tsunami envoy, stressed in a visit to Aceh on Saturday the need to "remove backlogs and speed up the land titling process, so that hundreds of thousands of Acehnese obtain the security of title that they so deserve."
Getting more people in permanent housing on their own land could help resolve other challenges of the recovery process like a lack of good jobs, Morris said.
By one estimate the tsunami wiped out 600,000 jobs, with fisheries, agriculture and small trade sectors among those most affected.
"I think that there's a relationship between provision of housing and land and creation of sustainable livelihoods. Once people have those assets they then move on to create new assets and to generate money," Morris said.
Ends
Highlighting the NGO association ACFID's report on lessons learnt from the Tsunami, in seminar 4 Aug 06 attended by
21 ACFID-member NGOs
AC’s 12 highlights
– click these to see context from report in italics:
2. A key
objective – need to apply the lessons this time, not just learn/unlearn as
before
3. Lesson
learned about shelter – better to engage the community in building on site
4. How
to turnaround survivor dissatisfaction
5. Lack
of coordination between NGOs including in procurement/warehousing, common
vouchers
6. Change
to survivor instead of supply-oriented approach
7. To
empower women in the aid-giving process
8. Coordination
so survivors’ expectations aren’t raised unrealistically
9. About
disappointing donor response to conflict disasters compared to tsunami disaster
10. Process-oriented
people are needed once the situation moves to reconstruction
11. NGOs’
negative affects on crisis communities
On Friday 4 August 2006 ACFID held a seminar in
Sydney for its members to discuss common challenges and lessons learnt from
their response to the humanitarian emergency caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami
of December 26th 2004. Thirty-nine participants from 21 member agencies, 2
non-member agencies and ACFID took part. The seminar comprised an introduction,
three sessions, each followed by a plenary, and a final general discussion
session drawing together the main themes, lessons and suggestions for action by
the sector, followed by an evaluation of the day. The three sessions covered
shelter projects, evaluation studies, and a range of projects with a focus on
gender, disability, children and the environment.
II. Introductory
session
In preparing for the seminar presenters had
been asked to be analytical and reflective. To put this agency analysis in
context, this short session reflected on the enormous scale of the disaster and
the response, and the difficulties/constraints encountered:
o pre-existing
vulnerabilities in affected communities e.g. poverty, gender inequalities,
civil war, etc.
o sometimes
confusing, bureaucratic, centralised policies, distrust or corruption
o the
enormous scale of the response from the international community; and,
o what
was achieved in relief operations, especially the prevention of epidemics.
Participants were asked to keep in mind
throughout the day some of the key themes/findings outlined in the report of
the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) :
o Coordination
o Needs
assessment: supply driven
o Impact
of the international response on local and national capacities
o Provision
of information to affected communities
o Links
amongst disaster preparedness relief-recovery-longer term development efforts
o Funding
response
The current international appeals system
delivers variable amounts of funding bearing little correlation with real needs
on a global level .
There are two other areas of work in which
ACFID is engaged that relate to issues
arising in the tsunami response. One is the constraint of human resources in
the sector and the other is the ongoing work on defining and ensuring
development effectiveness.
In recent years ACFID members have been
increasingly faced with difficulties in recruiting and retaining quality
program staff. To address these issues in a systematic way an ACFID Human
Resources Task Group has recently formed. Human resource constraints within our
members and the wider international community were apparent in the tsunami response.
Development/program effectiveness: the question
still needs to be asked from whose perspective? As NGOs who have signed on to
the NGO Effectiveness Framework one of our important areas of focus in our
programs should be on empowerment of beneficiaries and local-national
ownership.
Most importantly, we need to do something with
the lessons, which we seem to learn/unlearn time and again. As
Turning principles into practice.
III. Session
One: Shelter
All presenters noted that their agencies faced
the challenge of trying to achieve a balance between the expectations of a
number of stakeholders:
• Being
responsive to beneficiary needs and encouraging a participatory approach to the
reconstruction efforts
• Working
together with foreign governments
• Meeting
donor expectations
• Mobilising
building materials and expertise of adequate quality across large geographical
areas including remote locations cost
implications
• Meeting
all requirements including technical and planning standards across different
countries
Other key points: on site construction is
almost always preferable. It is better to allow people to stay in their own
communities and rebuild, than be off-site in temporary shelter, and dependent
on aid. Lead by example – e.g. only accepting quality building materials and
avoiding competition between agencies, which drives up prices. This is easier
said than done.
Various models were used even within the one
agency, e.g. community-driven contracting housing model and contractor-built
participatory housing model. There is no one right model for a specific context
and community. Obviously community consultation is paramount. There is a
growing body of literature concerning the advantages and risks of different
approaches .
An important dilemma is the development of new
inequities between those whose houses were destroyed and those whose were not
in the same communities.
There was a strong interest in ongoing dialogue
amongst ACFID members and others working in the shelter sector.
IV. Session
Two: Evaluation studies
What is Accountability?
ACFID: involve beneficiary groups to the maximum
extent possible in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects and
programs
HAP-I Principles commit signatories to fully
account for their actions (to all stakeholders), involve beneficiaries in the
project cycle, establish mechanisms for complaint and redress, inform
beneficiaries about, and work to, transparent standards (e.g. Sphere and the
Code of Conduct), demonstrating compliance through monitoring and reporting.
What are evaluations saying?
Fritz Institute: Beneficiary satisfaction with response
is decreasing.
TEC: There is a need to develop an aid
principle based on the right to seek, receive and impart information.
Oxfam’s experience:
o These
processes have been useful: use of notice boards, community meetings to discuss
program and financial information, local media and complaints boxes
o Cannot
rely always on partners’ mechanisms to provide adequate information to
beneficiaries and to hear complaints
o In
trying to mainstream “HAP-I” through a Program Quality Unit, there have been
mixed results with implementers sometimes feeling there was yet another layer
to deal with
o Dilemma
of how to be accountable to the non-tsunami affected who may have become more
marginalized by the relief effort
The main findings of a joint evaluation
conducted by World Vision, Care, Oxfam and CRS included:
1. Affirmed
that improved coordination and outcomes for beneficiaries and donors expected
if there were joint assessments at the outset of a response
2. The
lack of institutional knowledge and communication between key agencies
3. Ensure
that senior management takes responsibility for coordination and that it is not
delegated to junior staff
4. Recognise
the value of locally engaged staff and the expertise they bring
5. Look
at outcomes and impacts rather than outputs
6. Greater
community participation/ownership leads to more effective outcomes - time
trade-off
7. Procurement
and warehousing would benefit from better coordination
8. Introducing
vouchers can revitalise an economy
At the international level discussions are
taking place through the IWG funded by Gates foundation on how best to conduct
joint assessments.
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)
This coalition began in February 2005 to
improve quality and accountability to both donors and beneficiaries, and to
test a model for future evaluations of humanitarian responses. A key underlying
question is how do we get our systems to function and deliver when so much
money is raised?
TEC has made a number of recommendations. Those
of most resonance to participants at this seminar were:
1. The
international humanitarian community needs to change from being suppliers of
aid to facilitators of communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.
2. Increase
the linkages and coherence between different components of the disaster
response system, i.e. joint assessments, effective co-ordination, better
information sharing.
3. International
donors and agencies should treat recovery activities as development
interventions rather than as extensions to relief operations.
4. Aid
agencies need to significantly increase their accountability and transparency
to both aid recipients and the donor public.
5. The
international relief system should establish an accreditation system to
distinguish between agencies that work to a professional standard in a
particular sector from those that do not or have not done so.
6. All
actors need to make the current funding system more efficient, flexible,
transparent and in line with principles of good donor-ship.
Clinton-NGO Impact Initiative is related to but
separate from TEC. Papers are available for agencies interested in providing
feed-back to this initiative via ACFID on issues raised in these papers. This
needs to be done before October when
V. Session
Three: Inclusion
Women, children and people with disabilities
are often marginalized in development programs, and are perhaps even more
vulnerable in emergency response situations. Women should be empowered not
dis-empowered by processes used during relief and transitional phases, and
there are usually protection issues to consider.
Disability is not just about physical
disabilities, but also what is disabling - infrastructure and attitudes. People
with disabilities are often excluded from community consultations and as a
result, their special needs are not considered.
Apart from reunification with parents and
protection, children have special needs such as safe play areas, education and
health services. Agencies, which focus on women, disability and children, have
approaches and tools which will be of assistance in ensuring inclusion by other
agencies.
VI. What
would we do differently? What do we take forward?
1.
Even if it means a delay in doing assessments,
the advantages in this type of coordination amongst NGOs are many:
a. less
false raising of expectations amongst affected communities
b. reduction
in territoriality by agencies
c. drawing on and building local and
national capacity
d. more
efficient use of donor funds
This will require agencies to have agreed in
principle on this in advance of an emergency and would be most effective if the
teams were able to meet before deployment.
2.
Ensuring adequate effective information flows to affected communities
Beneficiaries have a right to information and
need it if they are to be in genuine partnership with agencies, so that we
empower not dis-empower local and national organisations and provide effective
assistance.
3.
Managing the expectations of beneficiaries, of local staff, of
volunteers and of donors at all stages of response and this will require
ongoing implementation of effective communication strategies.
4.
Review our fund-raising/appeals systems in order not to exceed our own
absorptive capacity and to spread funds more equitably globally to humanitarian
emergencies, particularly as natural disasters raise more funds than conflict
situations.
For consideration:
i. Individual
NGOs deciding at the out-set of an appeal what their cut-off point is for
closing the appeal
ii. Educating
the public to understand that:
a. Funds are needed beyond the relief phase
into longer-term development phases for
affected communities; and that
b. There may be marginalized people in
proximity to disaster/ conflict affected communities and they may become more
marginalized if development programs are not extended to them as well
iii. More agencies using tick boxes on donation
forms so people can allow their funding to be used for other relief and
development projects elsewhere if/when it is expected that excess funds will be
raised for a particular emergency.
5. The quality and mix of our human resources
must be improved
This is an ongoing issue for the Australian NGO
sector across the whole emergency-development continuum. As a generalisation,
emergency personnel are more task orientated, while development personnel are
more process orientated. We recognise that relief, moves into recovery, which
moves into development, when we need expatriate personnel who are more process
and participation-orientated. At the beginning of a response it is important to
have in the team personnel with experience in long-term community development
in order that transitions can be made.
Having the right personnel at each phase is an
important component of accountability to both beneficiaries and donors. Hence
accreditation of personnel could contribute to accountability. ACFID’s newly
formed Human Resources Task Group is in the early stages of developing a
concept paper on this topic for the sector. HAP-I is examining an international
accreditation system and work has been done by European NGOs in the Bioforce
project. All of these initiatives need to be considered in taking this issue
forward. Several participants cautioned against going down the accreditation
track. Some felt that peer reviews of personnel and agencies by in-country
partners offered a useful alternative, which could ensure quality of personnel
being engaged.
6. Encouraging the use of inclusive approaches
by all agencies
From the very beginning of the response the
special needs of children and people with disabilities need to be considered
and women’s views and needs included in all aspects of planning. Agencies with
expertise in inclusive approaches and tools can be drawn upon to mainstream
inclusiveness.
7.
Minimising the negative impacts of our presence
NGOs in collaboration with other international
organisations could map out expected negative impacts of their involvement on
communities and local land national organisations e.g. due to their lifestyle,
the contribution of their projects to inflation, etc., monitor and take action
to minimise these. A representative of FHF offered to develop a concept paper
on this for review by ACFID’s Humanitarian Reference Group and by participants.
8. Drawing on the collective experience to use
the most appropriate approach in specific contexts. For example, in shelter
work there are a number of approaches the strengths and weaknesses of which
have been well documented in the literature, and at this seminar.
VII. Feed-back
from participants
At the end of the day participants were invited
to provide feed-back. There was a high degree of satisfaction with the format
and content of the day and desire for ongoing dialogue and cooperation to
progress the issues summarised above. What was of interest to many and which
did not come out sufficiently in discussions was what agencies have learnt
about themselves and how if at all they have changed their processes as a
result of this learning. Many also felt that in future such meetings Human
Resource managers need to be encouraged to participate.
The secretariat noted that the intention had been to have presentations from human resource managers and communication and fund-raising areas but no papers had been received. Given that many of the issues to take forward involved these personnel, ACFID plans to hold another seminar for these personnel, addressing communication and fund-raising issues before the end of 2006.
• States should also set targets for national funding of DRR: If appealing for disaster response funding, they should design appeals to include funding for long-term DRR strategies and not just short- or medium-term relief and recovery.
The Executive Summary of TEC's July 2006 Synthesis Report is given in full, with key paragraphs linked to make this top overview.
Click these links to see these overviewed paragraphs in the context of the report Executive Summary and Bill Clinton's forward.
Foreword by the United Nations Secretary-General's
Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (Bill Clinton)
TEC
Synthesis Report [issued Jul 06]:
This report
synthesises the five Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) thematic evaluation reports,
2 Constraints and
achievements
3 Accountability,
ownership and recovery
5 INTERNATIONAL
RELIEF CAPACITY AND QUALITY
‘Poaching’ of
staff from national or local organisations can have mixed results:
Nonetheless, the
TEC reports show numerous examples of poor coordination.
Humanitarian
agencies have much to learn from the successful approach adopted by the IFIs:
The
recommendations [including a system of accreditation and certification] are:
In the immediate weeks following the
Therefore, I was greatly encouraged to see, in the early months of 2005,
an historic, collaborative process to evaluate key elements of the relief
and recovery effort. The TEC represents an extraordinary effort at reflection,
self-criticism and transparency. The studies it has sponsored, and this
Synthesis Report, provide an invaluable, independent account of how the tsunami
response has proceeded so far.
As reflected in the pages that follow, our efforts to respond to the tsunami
have placed in sharp relief both strengths and weaknesses in the way we
organize ourselves when faced with such massive challenges. Indeed, the report
includes both praise and uncomfortable reading, but the honesty of the analysis
does us all a great service.
This report and the companion thematic studies identify important lessons and
an agenda for reform that deserve careful analysis and an appropriate response.
They help us to see how we can and must do better in responding to ongoing and
future disaster relief and recovery challenges.
To my mind, the overriding messages of this report are three-fold:
First, we must do better at utilizing and working alongside local structures. With nothing but good intentions, the international community descends into crisis situations in enormous numbers and its activities too often leave the very communities we are there to help on the sidelines.
Second, we must find the will and the resources to invest much more in risk reduction and preparedness measures. Local structures and local measures - whether part of national or provincial government efforts or embedded in the communities - need to be strengthened to reduce vulnerabilities to tomorrow's disasters. And
Third, we must translate good intentions into meaningful reform. The report
identifies critical systemic challenges for the humanitarian community, many of
which were analyzed at length in the aftermath of the
The final story of the tsunami recovery process has yet to be written. This
is a multi-year effort, which makes it even more important that we pay close
heed to the analysis and recommendations in this report. I ask you to commit to
helping us multiply our successes, realign our efforts where necessary, and
retain the spirit of openness and self-criticism that this report so ably
embodies.
William Jefferson Clinton
Executive
summary By
1 THE REPORT
their
sub-studies and other materials relating to the
These
five studies are published alongside this Synthesis Report as a set,1 and their titles are: • Coordination of the
international response to tsunami-affected countries • The role of needs
assessment in the tsunami response • Impact of the tsunami response on local
and national capacities • Links between relief, rehabilitation and development
(LRRD) in the tsunami response • The funding response to the tsunami.
The
report consists of three main parts: an introduction; sections on the disaster
and response; and conclusions and recommendations.
It
addresses primarily the initial phase of the international response, up to the
first 11 months after the disaster.
2 Information on content, methods and
constraints are contained in the Introduction.
Background
On 26 December 2004, a
massive earthquake off the west coast of Northern
This
generated a series of tsunamis that killed people in 14 countries around the
Entire
coastal zones were destroyed, with the tsunamis causing damage up to 3km inland
in some cases.
The
total economic cost of the damage and the consequent losses were estimated at
US$9.9bn across the affected region, with
In
the
Pre-existing vulnerabilities, whether socioeconomic,
environmental, political, psychological, age- or gender-based, resulted in
multiple impacts.
Chronic
poverty, environmental degradation (such as overfishing and deforestation),
displacement, inequalities, weak respect for human rights, and long-running
armed conflict compounded the impact of the disaster.
While
parts of
The tasks, complexity of situations and scale of the
constraints facing locals, nationals and internationals alike in their efforts
to respond were enormous.
These
are explained in The Response section of this report.
In
the affected region, preexisting weaknesses in disaster-affected national and
local capacities were a major constraint.
Vacillating
and restrictive national and regional leadership constrained international
response activities in all of the affected countries to a greater or lesser
degree.
The
‘buffer zones’, in which residential reconstruction was initially forbidden and
later permitted within a particular distance of the shoreline, are a case in
point.
These
factors can include issues of land rights and availability, national poverty
trajectories and environmental considerations.
The
lack of significant, predictable, non-earmarked, multi-year funding for
developing appropriate international capacities is also a major drawback and
negatively affected the tsunami response in the way that agencies struggled to
scale up.
This
limited the effectiveness of international assessments and of recovery
activities, as did an evident shortage of relevant expertise, high turnover of
international staff, and a general lack of appropriate language skills.
Despite
these impediments, generous relief provided affected populations with the
security they needed to begin planning what to do next.
Large
amounts of funding allowed rapid initial recovery activities and some
innovative practices, including a wider use of cash grants than has been the
case in other emergencies.
The
gap between relief and recovery3 that
commonly appears in disaster response was avoided.
By month six in Aceh,
some 500,000 people had a solid roof over their heads (albeit mostly in host
families and although some 70,000 were still living in tents).
In
Tourist
numbers are on the rebound in
In
Disaster
preparedness, while limited, was carried out by some international agencies,
especially in
Weaknesses
in international operations must be seen against this background of both major
constraints and important achievements.
Disaster response was
mostly conducted by the affected people themselves.
Practically
all immediate life-saving actions and initial emergency support in the first
few days (and weeks in some cases) was provided by local people, often assisted
by the wider national public and institutions, including the national
militaries.
The
role of host families is an under-valued and often overlooked example.
The
international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and
supporting these actors, and when accountable to them.
More
sustainable, context-specific approaches, through and with local and national
capacities, are required.
In
industrialised countries, natural disaster response is managed (‘owned’) by the
affected states and communities.
Supporting
national and local ownership is a core principle of international development
and humanitarian aid.4 Exceptional international funding
provided the opportunity for an exceptional international response.
TEC
studies do not find that many international agencies lived up to their own
standards with regard to respect and support for local and national ownership:
where local and national capacities were recognised, they were often applied in
strengthening international agencies more than local responses.
‘[L]ocal
ownership… was undermined and some local capacities were rendered more
vulnerable’ (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p9).
Many
efforts and capacities of locals and nationals were marginalised by an
overwhelming flood of well-funded international agencies (as well as hundreds
of private individuals and organisations), which controlled immense resources.
Treating
affected countries as ‘failed states’ was a common error (TEC Needs Assessment
Study, 2006).
Information
is power.
Access
to high quality information enables affected people to define and demand
accountability, based on their own expectations and standards.
It
also allows them to plan their own recovery.
Yet
international agencies frequently failed in the modest objective of informing
affected people in an accurate, timely, and comprehensive manner.
‘[S]ome…
interventions may actually undermine future development[.] A lack of
information to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits
their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects’ (p10).
Such
shortcomings led to greater inequities, gender- and conflict-insensitive
programming, cultural offence and waste.
Moreover,
aid resources are rarely tracked accurately by the international system.
The
myth that any kind of international assistance is needed, and now, is fuelled
through lack of understanding among the mass media and donor public.
‘poaching’ of staff from national and local
entities; and limited participation of the affected-population.
‘Recovery’
is context- and location-specific, rather than time-bound.
It
can also occur alongside relief efforts.
While
it is too early to judge the ultimate success of tsunami recovery efforts – a
follow-up TEC LRRD study will be conducted in 2007 which will provide further
information on the progress of the recovery effort – indications of initial
performance are available.
Affected
people were appreciative of achievements and good practices, notable in, for
example, addressing transient poverty and the rapid move from relief to recovery.5 Recurrent weaknesses, however, included unduly
short-term approaches; a shortage of appropriate agency ‘recovery’ skills; and
poor understanding of local contexts, 5 There was no fixed
chronology for this, as the duration of the relief phase varied by sector and
location.
While relief approaches remained appropriate in some
sectors, others moved quickly to recovery.
such
as fishermen who possessed boats, while marginalising those who had few assets,
notably women and the most poor.
The
impact of the international presence on the peace and governance situation in
Aceh is deemed to have been positive, albeit not explicitly planned nor
commensurate with the scale of funding.
This
has not been the case in
Despite
advances in early warning systems, the tsunami response has rarely enhanced
local preparedness or significantly reduced longer term vulnerability.
How
people conceptualise and respond to risk in organising their own recovery has
been, so far, inadequately addressed.
LRRD
is a transition whereby recovery comes to be led by the affected people themselves.
Such
a shift away from dominance by the international community has been slow to
take hold.
It
would be reasonable to ask ‘Whose emergency was it?’
This
was the most rapidly and generously funded disaster response in history:
US$13.5 billion has been pledged or donated internationally for emergency
relief and reconstruction, including more than US$5.5 billion from the general
public in developed countries.
Private
donations6 broke many records.
Governments
were flexible and quite rapid in their funding.
Reporting
of pledges and commitments and the timeliness of official donations has been
better than in other crises.
In
some cases, funds were reallocated due to the wealth of tsunami response
resources.
Audits
and evaluations were often commissioned exceptionally early by implementing
agencies.
The
budgetary constraints normally associated with humanitarian action did not
exist.
‘Good
donorship’ responsibilities were not, therefore, restricted to official donors.
Few
international agencies tried to halt fundraising when limits were reached.
The
TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p17) sums up the impact of generous funding
on implementing agencies as follows:
Finally,
the relative excess of 6 The term ‘private’ covers both the
general public and private entities such as companies, religious groups or
associations – ie, all non-institutional donors.
The bulk of these donations came from private
individuals.
21 Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report funding was a disincentive to assess, to coordinate
and to apply the results of the few collective assessments.
Both
governments and international agencies failed to ensure that funding was
needs-based.
Imbalances,
non-needs-driven motivations (including supporting NGOs based in a donor’s own
country, regardless of whether they had any comparative advantage over other
NGOs), poor ‘end-user’ traceability and inadequate monitoring were evident
among official donor responses.
‘Allocation
and programming, particularly in the first weeks and months of 2005, were
driven by politics and funds not by assessment and need’ (TEC Funding Response
Report, 2006, p38).
Slow,
overlapping, poorly shared and imprecise assessments were a constraint.
Also,
the allocation of funds was fairly evenly split between relief and recovery.
This
did not reflect the reality that recovery needs are by far the most important.7
The
limited number of agencies with the capacity to absorb the scale of funding
available was a constraint, as was the lack of system-wide definitions and
standards for reporting of funds.
Cascading
layers of contracts among international, national and local organisations
compounded these problems:
(TEC Funding Response Report, 2006, p36) The
flow of financial information locally to affected populations in their own
languages was also weak.
Additionally,
each donor has unique proposal and reporting formats, which makes donor
reporting costly, complicates tracking and adds little value.
Funding
databases such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Development
Assistance Database (DAD) were welcome but insufficient tools.
While
tsunami funding may not have reduced funding for other emergencies, if more of
it had been reallocated it would have increased funding for other emergencies.
The
current international appeals system delivers variable amounts of funding
bearing little correlation with real needs on a global level.
For
example, the World Food Programme (WFP) in the
This
lack of adherence to core funding principles almost three years after the
adoption of the GHD principles is striking.
5 INTERNATIONAL RELIEF CAPACITY AND QUALITY
The
quality and capacity of the international relief system is inadequate given the
scale and frequency of modern emergencies.
Greater
and more consistent investment in personnel, coordination, 7
It should be recognised, however, that some donors strongly favoured recovery
or reconstruction over emergency relief activities.
22 Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report assessment and quality control, including agency
certification/accreditation, is necessary.
The
capacity of the international disaster response system to respond to sudden
increases in demand (the ‘surge capacity’) is very limited.
The
lack of a career structure in general encourages high turnover and recruitment
of inexperienced personnel.
Despite
initiatives within the sector to address some of these issues, relatively few
people are adequately trained and few of them are from developing countries.
The
tsunami response highlighted major weaknesses in international staff profiles,
staff quality and continuity.
debilitating the contributions of those local
organisations to recovery, while perhaps strengthening international agency
capacity and developing the ‘poached’ individuals.
Yet
international capacity is most effective when combined appropriately with local
capacity:
The
appointment of a high profile UN Special Envoy for the tsunami response was
seen as a positive step.
Also,
coordination (of both UN/international actors and internally to the RC
Movement) showed a marked improvement in late 2005.
Three
issues stand out: the proliferation of agencies made coordination more
expensive and less effective; generous funding (especially private) reduced
agencies’ need to coordinate; and the perceived need for quick, tangible,
agency-specific results fuelled competition for visibility, ‘beneficiaries’ and
projects.
The
absence of agreed field representation mechanisms for (well-funded) NGOs and
poor coordination skills among some managers complicated coordination.
These
were compounded by lack of clarity between coordination at the operational
level (who does what) and coordination at the policy level (including joint
advocacy).
The
military played a key role in the disaster response.
They
will most likely, despite their high cost, continue to do so globally.
Just
as there was a profusion of agencies, there was a profusion of assessments.
Most
were conducted by agencies for their own needs and did not influence collective
decision takers.
Media
reports had a large influence on donor policy, thus taking the place of more
formal assessments.
Almost
all international assessments relied on data culled from national and local
sources.
Better
national and local preparedness would have made a big difference.
A
single, authoritative joint-assessment, at least between the UN, the RC
Movement and the authorities, was sorely missing.
expedient
cooperation among all partners (above all, the national governments),
significant influx of expertise and visibility, and use of teams of analysts to
reconcile and compile the various sources of information.
(TEC
Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p12) Quality and capacity are closely linked,
and all major relief responses have raised questions about the quality of the
response.
Several
quality initiatives have emerged in the last decade, mostly in response to the
Despite
important steps, the lack of quality enforcement mechanisms means that the same
problems keep reappearing in emergency responses (the
Actors
whose primary institutional motivation is not humanitarian also proliferated,
such as the military and commercial enterprises.
One
reason for this is the ease of entry of inexperienced and incompetent actors
into humanitarian operations.
The
recurrence of many of the problems seen in the
Public
knowledge is often limited, however, to the materials produced by agencies’
communications departments and/or media that concentrate either on these agency
sources or on single dramatic issues rather than presenting a comprehensive
analysis of the situation.
This
lack of information flow from the affected people to the donor population on
the quality of the response means that there is little external pressure for improvement in the
humanitarian sector.
If
there were significant external pressure for change, many of the problems
within the sector would not have been left unresolved for so long.
The
limited impact of the existing, voluntary quality initiatives suggests that we
are unlikely to see any major improvement in the quality of humanitarian
response.
and
to provide detailed and accurate information to the donor public and taxpayers
on the outcomes of assistance, including the affected populations’ views of
that assistance.
Four main recommendations emerge from this Synthesis
Report.
In
line with the TEC reports, they are aimed primarily at international actors.
Section
5 of the Synthesis Report presents these recommendations in more detail,
explaining the rationale behind them and analysing their implications.
Annex
E further presents a list of ‘enablers’ for the recommendations, broken down by
international actor.
1 The international humanitarian community
needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and
facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.
2 All actors should strive to increase
their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence
between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response
system, including those from the affected countries themselves.
3 The international relief system should
establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies
that work to a professional standard in a particular sector.
4 All actors need to make the current
funding system impartial, and more efficient, flexible, transparent and better
aligned with principles of good donorship.
Source (Executive Summary):
http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/4AEE4A76-7275-4AAE-900B-BADDC70D6880/0/ExSum.pdf
Full report with thematic evaluation reports:
http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/AC14DE14-D7D7-4BB9-8255-B97D736A5ADF/0/SynthRep.pdf